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IN EARLY 2013, farmers in Iowa and across the Midwest braced for 
a difϐicult corn market, with prices 
declining from $7/bushel in late 2012 
to $4/bushel in early 2015, and ϐinally 
settling at $3/bushel. Shielded from 
the world market, corn producers in 
China enjoyed a steady elevated corn 
price of almost $10/bushel from 2011 
until 2015—largely a result of China’s 
obscure price ϐloor corn policy. While 
China’s corn production is mainly 
used for domestic consumption, policy 
changes in China’s corn markets have 
trade implications for the global corn, 
beef, and pork sectors. For example, 
last month, the United States ϐiled 
a complaint with the World Trade 
Organization over China’s excessive 
subsidies to corn, rice, and wheat 
farmers (OUSTR 2016). In this article, 
we examine why China has ended its 
nine-year-old corn price support policy, 
and implemented new corn policies.
China’s Costly Corn Support Price 
Program 2007–2016
Corn, wheat, rice, and soybeans are 
major crops in China, and Chinese 
farmers have been paying agricultural 
taxes to grow these crops for almost 
two thousand years. In 2004, China 
switched from taxing corn farmers 
to providing subsidies for seed and 
machine purchases. To further boost 
rural income and ensure national food 
security, China started a nationwide 
corn stockpiling program in 2007. A 
key feature of this policy is that the 
government collects corn from farmers 
at minimum support prices, which 
are typically substantially higher than 
market prices. This signiϐicantly distorts 
the market—artiϐicially elevated 
support prices have enticed farmers to 
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grow corn and sell to the state storage 
facilities, while rising labor cost due to 
the increased rural income from this 
support policy have kept corn prices 
high. Figure 1 shows historical corn 
future prices in China and the United 
States—clearly revealing that from 
2007 to 2016 China’s policy drove corn 
prices up to two or three times that of 
US corn prices. Interestingly, it seems 
that China’s support price program has 
gone through two phases: (a) from 2007 
to 2010, the target support price for 
corn tracked closely to the corn import 
price plus a 65 percent out-of-quota 
duty; and (b) in 2011, China unveiled a 
ϐixed and extremely costly support price 
policy that kept futures prices between 
$9–$10/bushel for almost ϐive years.
High corn prices created incentive 
for Chinese farmers to produce 
more corn (see Figure 2). Farmers 
planted corn in grasslands, deserts, 
on mountainsides, and in marshes 
under the high corn price, increasing 
total acres to 95 million—a 26 
percent increase from 2006 to 2015 
(Li 2016). In 2012, corn exceeded 
rice in production to become China’s 
largest grain crop (SCD 2015). The 
corn support policy also led to a drop 
in domestic corn consumption as 
well as a substantial increase in the 
import of corn substitutes. This is due 
to the high domestic corn price and 
a spatial mismatch between where 
corn is grown and where it is used. As 
Figure 3 shows, major corn production 
occurs in northern China, while the 
corn demand, proxied by leading pork 
production regions, is mainly located 
in the south. Corn in China is mainly 
used for feed, and transportation costs 
from the production to consumption 
areas makes imported feed a cheaper 
alternative (Iowa Farm Bureau 2014). 
Corn end-users in China (e.g., feed 
processing plants, livestock producers, 
bio-reϐineries) need to tradeoff 
between domestic corn and imported 
corn. On the one hand, corn produced 
in northeastern China has a steep 
Figure 1. China and US corn future prices 2005–2016

1
Wu and Zhang: Of Maize and Markets: China’s New Corn Policy
Published by Iowa State University Digital Repository, 2016
8 / Agricultural Policy Review
“rats in warehouses” (Hornby 2015). 
Some industry analysts estimate that over 
20 MMT of corn reserves are so moldy 
or deteriorated that they are no longer 
suitable for human consumption or feed 
use (Gale, Jewison, and Hansen 2014). 
Due to the huge ϐinancial and storage 
burden, this stockpiling program was 

support price plus a roughly 15 percent 
transportation cost; on the other hand, 
imported corn has a 65 percent out-
of-quota duty for imports beyond the 
quota, plus barging costs and a $20/
ton ocean transport fee. The gray line 
in Figure 1 presents the 65 percent out-
of-quota duty upon imported US No. 
2 corn prices, revealing that Chinese 
corn was still too expensive from 2013 
to 2015. As a result, massive amounts 
of corn and corn substitutes (sorghum, 
barley, DDGS, cassava chips, and cassava 
starch) were imported by China. In 
particular, Figure 4 reveals China’s 
imports of corn, sorghum, and barley 
have more than quadrupled from 2011 
to 2015 compared to low steady levels 
from 2005 to 2006. This is likely driven 
by the dramatic policy shift to a steep 
support price of $9–$10/bushel in 2011 
(as shown in Figure 1). 
As Figure 5 shows, China’s 
escalating corn storage is a noticeable 
outcome of the price support policy—
China and the United States had roughly 
the same ending stocks in 2006/07, but 
in 2015/16, China’s were almost double 
the US supply. Increased storage was the 
intention of the Chinese government, 
but is more a result of excessive 
production, import demand triggered 
by the support price policy, and a lack of 
domestic demand. In fact, warehouses 
in northeastern China currently have no 
room to store grain. More interestingly, 
corn storage accumulated faster after 
China unveiled the $9–$10/bushel ϐixed 
support prices in early 2011. By the 
end of 2015, China had stored enough 
corn for at least six months of domestic 
consumption. In contrast, the global 
average storage-to-consumption ratio is 
roughly 20 percent.
The stockpiling and support price 
policy has a steep price tag for China—the 
government faces signiϐicant ϐinancial 
burden due to high procurement prices. 
USDA estimated this policy has cost China 
more than $10 billion (Ballard 2016). The 
price support policy also took a toll on 
China’s aging storage facilities. In addition 
to corn degradation caused by structural 
deϐiciencies of warehouses, problems like 
mismanagement were commonplace; 
in fact, Chinese state television reported 
ofϐicials proϐited from selling inferior 
grains at new grain prices, dubbing them 
Figure 2. Corn production and consumption in China and the US 2000–2016 
Figure 3. Major corn and pork production provinces in China
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discontinued by the Chinese government 
in March 2016. 
China’s New Corn Subsidy Program
To replace the state stockpiling program 
and support price policy, China adopted 
a direct payment corn subsidy policy 
tied to planting acres in spring 2016—a 
policy familiar to US farmers. China’s 
Ministry of Finance will allocate a 
30-billion-yuan corn subsidy ($4.51 
billion) to farmers in four provinces 
in northeastern China, which boasts 
more than 60 percent of China’s corn 
production (Patton and Hogue 2016), in 
the 2016/17 crop year. The payment in 
each county will vary depending on the 
ratio of funds to area planted in corn, 
ranging from US $109–$163 per acre 
with an average of 150 yuan per mu 
($137 per acre) (Dim Sums 2016b,c).
China is now also employing 
multiple measures to cut corn 
production and storage. First, the 
Chinese government just permitted 
state-owned companies to export 
about 2 million metric tons of corn 
to neighboring countries including 
Central Asia (Dim Sums 2016a). 
Second, China’s Ministry of Agriculture 
is forecasting a 5-million-acre 
reduction in corn in 2016 due to 
the dramatically lower corn price, 
especially in fringe production areas 
out of the four northeast provinces 
(MAPRC 2015). Corn acreage is 
projected to drop from 93 million acres 
to around 86 million acres in 2018–
2020 (Dim Sums 2015), and converted 
corn acreage is projected to soybean, 
other coarse grains, and fodder crops. 
Third, companies and interest groups 
have been lobbying the Chinese 
government to subsidize the use of 
stored corn for biofuel production.
Implications for US Agriculture
China is the largest and third-largest 
importer of US soybean and pork, 
respectively; therefore, it is critically 
important to assess China’s corn policy 
and its impacts on US agriculture. 
In the short run, it seems China will 
embrace a direct payment corn subsidy 
program, similar to what the United 
States adopted about two decades ago. 
As a measure to decrease stored corn, 
China is offering corn exports at lower 
prices than the United States and Brazil, 
which could potentially put a downward 
pressure on the global corn market. 
However, the poor quality of stored corn 
might hinder China’s role in the global 
corn export market. In the meantime, 
China’s imports of corn substitutes 
might decrease in order to encourage 
domestic consumption. 
In the medium and long run, 
China is downplaying the strategic 
role of corn, and only regarding wheat 
and rice as its two main food crops, 
which may suggest the possibility 
Figure 4. China corn, sorghum, barley, and oat imports 2005–2016
Figure 5. China and US corn ending stocks 2000–2016
continued on page 14
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of a transition from a target of 
self-sufϐiciency towards greater 
involvement in the global marketplace. 
As the Chinese people demand more 
pork and beef with rising per capita 
income, China will likely need more 
corn and corn substitutes in the future. 
This need will be ampliϐied with 
limited arable land, degrading soil 
quality, and an exodus of rural youth 
to cities. USDA projects that China will 
need to import signiϐicant amounts 
of corn—up to 22 MMT—by 2023/24 
(Hansen and Gale 2014). The United 
States, along with Ukraine and Brazil, 
would likely be a major player if that 
were to happen. 
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